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Extradition and Double Jeopardy: Will the "Same
Transaction" Test Succeed in an
International Context?
The United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be
"subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
. . "I American courts first attempted to define the key phrase "same
offense" in the 1871 case of Morey v. Commonwealth .2 The Afore, court set
forth what has come to be known as the "same evidence" test for deter-
mining identity of offenses: "a conviction or acquittal upon one indict-
ment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another,
unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them
would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other." 3
Since Morey, the courts have struggled, with only partial success, to de-
fine the term "same offense" in a just and consistent manner.4 The prob-
lem lies in retaining the Constitution's original purpose of protecting an
individual from unfair harassment and double punishment in the face of
the immense proliferation and specialization of substantive criminal law.
This proliferation frequently creates a situation where a defendant will
violate several different statutes in the course of a single criminal episode.
He then may be separately tried and punished for each violation. A
common variation of this problem occurs when a defendant violates a
single statute several times in the course of a larger crime, as, for in-
stance, by breaking into a home and robbing several occupants. In
Guszkofv. United States,5 the Fifth Circuit recently dealt with yet a third
type of situation. Defendants in Gusikof violated nearly identical statutes
of two countries, the United States and Great Britain. Although the
facts of Gusikof did not present the court with a difficult double jeopardy
problem, the court's perception of what constitutes the "same offense,"
and the implications of its holding, are good indicators of the extent of
the continuing definitional problem.
In March 1975, defendants in Guszkof were charged with "con-
spir[ing] either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 2.
2 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
3 Id. at 434.
4 See generally, M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 452-59 (1974); S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1966).
5 620 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
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defraud the United States' 6 by conspiring to violate the mail 7 and wire
fraud 8 statutes. The charges stemmed from defendants' activities be-
tween January 1972 and July 1973 in the perpetration of a fraudulent
jewelry franchise scheme. Defendants had mailed false promotional
literature as an inducement for prospective franchise purchasers. They
pleaded guilty and were sentenced to two years imprisonment. 9
In April 1979, the United Kingdom sought to extradite defendants1 °
on substantially the same charges" as a result of defendants' operation
between June 1973 and September 1975 of a British jewelry company.
The charges focused on defendants' attempts to sell franchises through
the distribution of fraudulent promotional literature. On appeal before
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, defendants alleged that the double
jeopardy provision of the American-British Extradition Treaty 12 barred
their extradition to England to face prosecution on these charges. They
contended that the British offense was essentially the same offense for
which they had already been prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in the
United States and that their extradition was therefore barred by Article
V(1)(a) of the Extradition Treaty.13
The court faced no real definitional dilemma in finding defendants
6 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
7 Id. § 1341.
8 Id. § 1343.
9 620 F.2d at 463. Defendants were directed to serve only four months of the sentence
and were placed on probation for the balance. Id. n.5.
10 The extradition procedure under a bilateral treaty is begun by the filing of a complaint
by the requesting nation in the U.S. jurisdiction where the defendant is found. The complaint
charges the defendant with having committed one of the crimes enumerated in the treaty while
within the jurisdiction of that nation. The magistrate or judge will then issue an arrest warrant
for the individual in order to hold a hearing on the charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). The
hearing is generally limited to four basic questions: 1) is this the individual wanted by the
requesting nation; 2) is the evidence sufficient to show probable cause of the individual's guilt;
3) is the offense one of those included in the treaty; and 4) is there any bar in the treaty to the
individual's extradition. 620 F.2d at 462; Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1191
(5th Cir. 1971). If the individual is found extraditable, the magistrate will certify to that effect
and transmit a copy of the testimony to the Secretary of State for a final decision on the surren-
der of defendant. Defendant may not appeal a magistrate's decision, but may file a writ of
habeas corpus with the district court, which is appealable if denied. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976) (Secretary of State to surrender defendant to the foreign gov-
ernment); id. § 3190 (evidence permitted at the extradition hearing). Habeas corpus review is
very limited, however, and cannot be used for purposes of a rehearing of the evidence presented
to the committing court. 450 F.2d at 1192-93.
1' Defendants were charged with violating the Theft Act of 1968, c. 60, § 15(1), which
applies to one "who by any deception dishonestly obtains property belonging to another, with
the intention of permanently depriving the other of it ....
12 Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Jan. 21, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 277, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [herein-
after cited as Treaty]. Article V(I) of the Treaty states:
Extradition shall not be granted if:
(a) the person sought would, if proceeded against in the territory of the requestedParty/or the ofense for which hir extradition is reqfesled, be entitled to be discharged
on the grounds of a previous acquittal or conviction in the territory of the request-
ing or requested Party or of a third State . . . . (emphasis added).
13 620 F.2d at 463.
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extraditable under the Treaty. The two sets of charges were clearly not
related to the "same offense" under any construction of that term. The
court found that the American charges were based on a conspiracy to
commit fraud, arising from the dealings of an American company, con-
ducted exclusively in New York between 1972 and 1973. In contrast, the
British charges were based on the substantive crime of fraud in theloper-
ation of a British company, perpetrated solely in Great Britain between
1973 and 1975. Although the two indictments resulted from the same
type of criminal act, they clearly were not referring to the same acts. 14
The importance of Gusikoff, therefore, lies not in the holding itself, which
was manifestly compelled by the facts of the case. It is rather the ration-
ale underlying the holding-the way the court deals with the subtleties
of the term "same offense"-that warrants close examination.
Morey was the first American decision to define "same offense" for
the purpose of dealing with multiple prosecutions.' 5 In Morey, defend-
ant's earlier prosecution and conviction for unlawful cohabitation was
held not to bar a later trial for adultery because the evidence necessary
for conviction of the former charge was not sufficient to convict on the
latter charge.' 6 From this case arose the traditional "same evidence" test
for determining identity of offenses, under which two offenses are differ-
ent only if each statute violated requires proof of an additional fact not
required by the other statute. In Gavieres v. United States,' 17 the Supreme
Court applied this test to uphold defendant's second conviction for the
same indecent behavior in a public place.' 8 Although based upon the
same words and conduct as the first conviction, the second charge of in-
sulting a public official required that the words be spoken to the official,
an additional fact not necessary for the first, more general charge of
drunkenness and indecent behavior in a public place.' 9 In another ma-
jor case, Blockburger v. United States,20 the Supreme Court upheld its ear-
14 As the court notes, conspiracy and the substantive crime are always separate offenses;
one dealing with the agreement, the other with the act itself. 620 F.2d at 464. See text accom-
panying note 69 infia.
15 Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. at 434. There are two situations in which double
jeopardy considerations may arise. The first is in a case of multiple punishment in the context
of a single trial. This occurs when a defendant is punished separately for each count of a multi-
count indictment arising from a single act. The second situation arises where a defendant is
prosecuted once for one aspect of his crime and then later reprosecuted for some other aspect of
the same crime. See generally Schwartz, Multiple Pumhmentfor the "Same Oense': Michigan Grap-
ples with the Definitional Problem, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 825 (1979).
16 108 Mass. at 436.
17 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
18 Id. at 343.
19 Id. at 342. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959),
maintains that the Supreme Court has never sanctioned the "same evidence" test in cases in-
volving multiple prosecutions, and distinguishes Gavieres as a case occurring in the Philippines,
"a territory with long-established legal procedures that were alien to the common law." Id. at
198 n.2.
20 284 U.S. 299 (1932). It should be noted that Blockburger deals with a question of multi-
ple punishment, not multiple prosecution, where considerations of unfair harassment of the
defendant are not present.
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lier ruling in Gavieres by again finding that the proper test is whether
each statutory provision charged requires proof of a fact that the other
does not.2 1 The durability of this test is apparent from holdings as recent
as 1980 that still rely on the necessity of proof of an additional fact to
find separate offenses in multiple punishment cases. 22
Over the years, three different versions of the basic same evidence
test have developed.2 3 The first version is the "required evidence" test,
which considers the evidence necessary under the statute to determine
identity of offenses. Blockburger and most of the earlier cases use this
test.2 4 The second variation is the "alleged evidence" test, which consid-
ers the similarity of the allegations in the two indictments to determine if
the evidence alleged creates one or more offenses.25 The third test is the
"actual evidence" test, which looks at the similarity of the evidence actu-
ally produced at the trials. 2
6
Another approach to the "same offense" definitional problem that is
becoming increasingly popular in modern cases began with the powerful
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Abbate v. Uni'ted States. 27 The
majority held that a state prosecution does not preclude a later federal
prosecution for the same acts. 28 Their decision was based on firmly es-
tablished precedent regarding separate state and federal sovereignty dat-
ing back to 1847.29 Although the Court did not find it necessary to
consider the question, the Government relied on the same evidence test
for part of its argument and cited Blockburger. 30 The Government con-
tended that the two indictments were not for the same offense because
the federal charge required proof of an additional element for conviction
not found in the state charge.3 ' In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted
that the Government's argument could easily be applied to successive
21 Id. at 304.
22 E.g. United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). Defendant was convicted
simultaneously of transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce and of concealing
and selling the same motor vehicle, two offenses which the court found to "clearly require proof
of different sets of facts." Id. at 1117.
23 Comment, Twice biJeopard, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 269 (1965).
24 Id. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304.
25 Comment, supra note 23, at 269. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 P. 88 (1924).
26 Comment, supra note 23, at 270. This test, however, forces a defendant to go through a
second trial to determine whether the trial itself will be barred, a rather inconsistent result. The
actual evidence test, despite its drawbacks, is still considered by some commentators the most
effective of the three tests in preventing arbitrary reprosecutions, because a defendant cannot be
reprosecuted on a different charge based on the same evidence. See, e.g., People v. Martinis, 46
Misc. 2d 1066, 261 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1965).
27 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
28 Id. at 195.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13
(1852); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847).
30 359 U.S. at 196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 196 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The state charge was for conspiring to injure or
destroy property of another; the federal charge was for conspiring to injure or destroy communi-
cations facilities of the United States. Id. at 187.
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federal prosecutions based on the numerous and highly specific federal
statutes, with dangerous constitutional implications for the fifth amend-
ment protection against double jeopardy. 32 He therefore rejected the
same evidence test completely, stating that "successive federal prosecu-
tions of the same person based on the same acts are constitutionally pro-
hibited, even if the statutes require different evidence . . . .,,33 Justice Brennan
went on to emphasize that successive prosecutions would serve to wear
out and harass a defendant contrary to the purpose of the fifth amend-
ment clause against double jeopardy. 34 He ended by advocating a single
trial for all offenses resulting from the same criminal act.
35
The following year, in Petite v. United States,36 the Justice Depart-
ment, apparently heeding Justice Brennan's suggestion, discontinued
prosecution of a defendant who had already been convicted at the state
level for the same act. 3 7 In expressing what has come to be known as the
"Petite policy," the Justice Department stated that the "general policy of
the Federal Government" is "that several offenses arising out of a single
transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made
the basis of multiple prosecutions . . . . 3 To that end, the Govern-
ment Las established the policy that "no federal case should be tried
when there has been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts
. ..without . . .demonstrating compelling Federal interests for such
prosecution. ",39
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided Ashe v. Swenson 40 and added yet
another dimension to the already confused set of criteria for determining
"same offense."''4 The Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is a rule of federal law embodied in the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. 42 Any issue, once litigated and decided in the defend-
ant's favor at a previous trial, may not be relitigated, even if the two
offenses are different.4 3 Even more important for purposes of the holding
in Gus'koff is the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan. In a much-
quoted passage, Justice Brennan reiterated his position in the Abbate dis-
sent 44 that the double jeopardy clause requires the prosecution to join at
one trial all the charges against the defendant which grow out of "a sin-
32 Id. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 198 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam).
37 Id. at 530.
38 Id.
39 United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-2.142, cited in Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 178
(2d Cir. 1980)(emphasis added).
4 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
41 A thorough discussion of the implications of Ashe is found in Note, Doublejeopardy: Mul-
ttpe Prosecutins Aristng from the Same Transaation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259 (1978).
42 397 U.S. at 445.
43 Id. at 443.
44 Ste text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
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gle criminal act, occurrence or transaction." '4 5  From this passage
emerged the "same transaction" test for determining identity of offenses.
Much broader than the old same evidence test, the same transaction test
requires joinder of all charges stemming from a single criminal transac-
tion which the prosecution contemplates bringing.46 The Court has not
yet accepted this test as the majority position, 4 7 but a significant number
of state courts have begun using "same transaction" language in deciding
double jeopardy problems. 4
One of the more important of the recent extradition cases dealing
with a double jeopardy clause 49 is Stowe v. Devoy. 50 Defendant Stowe was
convicted in New York of possession and sale of 100 pounds of hashish
while on bail pending trial of a Canadian charge of conspiracy to import
and importation of five and one-half pounds of hashish into Canada.
After his U.S. conviction, Canada requested extradition of Stowe for trial
on this charge. Stowe was held extraditable and filed a habeas corpus
petition which was denied.5' Stowe appealed the denial claiming that
the double jeopardy clause of the American-Canadian treaty barred his
extradition. 52 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found the two offenses in question to be different "under
any of the commonly accepted tests used to define the 'same offense'
.. . .- The court went on to state that any previous charges against
defendant must cover the same acts as those which were the subject of
the extradition request. 54 In order for two sets of charges to refer to the
"same offense" under Stowe, they must refer to the same act or acts and
require the same evidence to prove each of them.
45 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 See ,d.
47 See, e.g., Cecil v. United States, 444 U.S. 882 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 See State v. Ahune, 52 Hawaii 321, 474 P.2d 1191 (1970); People v. White, 390 Mich.
245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973). See also 40 MINN. STATS. ANN. § 609.035
(West 1965)(statutory enactment of the same transaction test); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 40.20(2)
(McKinney 1970)(same). The test also has been adopted by several national organizations,
including the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute. See ABA Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to Joinder & Severance § 1.3
(Approved Draft 1968); ALl Model Penal Code § 1.07(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). -Both
documents refer to offenses "based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal epi-
sode."
49 Some examples of extradition treaties and their double jeopardy clauses are: Treaty on
Extradition between the United States and Australia, May 14, 1974, art. VII(1)(a), 27 U.S.T.
957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234; Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Denmark, June
22, 1972, art. 7(1)-(2), 25 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864; Convention on Extradition between
the United States and Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, art. VI(1)-(2), 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.
50 588 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cer'. derned, 442 U.S. 931 (1979).
51 Id. at 339.
52 I.
53 Id. at n.6. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
54 588 F.2d at 340. The court found that the double jeopardy clause had not been invoked
by the extradition request because the charges were different (and required different evidence to
prove each of them) and because the 100 pounds of hashish involved in the New York case was
different from the five and one-half pounds that concerned the Canadian authorities. Id. at 339.
EXTRADITION AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Recently, in Sindona v. Grant,55 the Second Circuit greatly modified
the view it had expressed in Stowe. Defendant in Sindona, a well-known
Italian financier, was being sought by Italian authorities in connection
with a giant bank fraud scheme and other related criminal activities. He
previously had been charged in America with a large number of crimes
ranging from conspiracy to mail fraud to embezzlement in connection
with the same scheme. Defendant contended that, under the double
jeopardy clause of the American-Italian Extradition Treaty, his extradi-
tion was barred by the existence of the American charges. 56 The Second
Circuit refused to apply any of the commonly accepted tests, such as the
Blockburger required evidence test that it had applied in Stowe, calling
that test a "crabbed and wholly inappropriate reading" of the double
jeopardy clause of the treaty. 5 7 Instead, the court said that the standard
to be applied "should be at least as broad as that expressed in Mr. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson . . .or in the Petite pol-
icy . . ,"5 The court refused to find Sindona nonextraditable, how-
ever, because even under such a broad standard the court found no
identity of the American and Italian offenses. 59 The court also noted
that &ie same transaction test's goal of joining all claims at one trial
would be impossible in this case due to principles of territorial jurisdic-
tion which would prohibit an American court from trying Sindona for
the bulk of his Italian crimes.6° With Sindona, the Second Circuit re-
jected the commonly accepted same evidence or same acts test, at least in
extradition cases, and endorsed a "modified and more flexible test of
whether the same conduct or transaction underlies the criminal charges
in both transactions. '61
The decision in Gusikof followed that in Sndona by less than three
months. It provided the first opportunity for another circuit to follow
the Second Circuit's lead in applying the same transaction test as the
standard test in extradition cases. The Fifth Circuit in Gustkof, however,
chose to express its awareness of the broader standard advocated in
Sindona merely in dicta, while rejecting its application to the facts before
the court. The court summarily stated at the end of its opinion that the
acts involved in Gusikof did not "grow out of a single criminal act, occur-
rence, episode or transaction."'62 The court instead relied primarily on
55 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
56 Id. at 172.
57 Id. at 178. The court explained that "[f]oreign countries could hardly be expected to be
aware of Blokkburgr; moreover,. . . in construing a double jeopardy clause in a treaty, embody-
ing an ancient and widely recognized principle of civilized conduct, a court should not deem
itself bound by a quiddity of the law of the requested party." Id.
58 Id. at 179.
59 Id. The court also took into consideration the assurances of the Italian government that
defendant would not be prosecuted in Italy for the American transactions. Id. at 180.
60 Id. at 179.
61 Id. at 178.
62 620 F.2d at 464 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concur-
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Stowe and its interpretation of the same offense language, 63 an interpre-
tation that the Second Circuit openly rejected in Sdona.64 By relying on
Stowe, the Fifth Circuit ignored an opportunity to become one of the
innovators in this area.
The Gusikof court's reliance on Stowe, however, is not really objec-
tionable. The offenses in the two indictments seem to deal with clearly
distinct acts or transactions under any test, whether it be the older, nar-
rower Stowe test or the broader, more modern Sindona test. Therefore,
application of the same transaction test would have made no difference
to the outcome in Guskoff. Further, the scope of the crimes involved in
Gusikof was so wide that application of the same transaction test would
have effectively acquitted defendants of many of their crimes. This sec-
ond consideration can be illustrated by the following hypothetical. As-
sume the alleged fraudulent American and British acts of defendants
were all part of one giant international scheme to defraud investors in
defendants' company, and defendants had already been convicted on the
U.S. charges. Defendants now argue that because all the acts were part
of the same transaction, their extradition is barred. All acts growing out
of the same transaction constitute the same offense, and they may not be
tried twice for the same offense under the Extradition Treaty. This situa-
tion is very similar to that in Sindona, and defendant in that case made a
similar argument. Although the Sindona court adopted a standard as
broad as Justice Brennan's in construing the double jeopardy clause, it
found defendant's argument in that case unacceptable because it would
broaden the standard beyond all reasonable limits, to the point where
many elements of the one huge crime would go unpunished.65 A similar
situation would occur in any extradition case where some of the foreign
crimes did not contain an "American element" sufficient to give a U.S.
court jurisdiction over them. This situation creates one of the major dif-
ficulties with applying the same transaction test to an international case,
especially one where a large proportion of the crimes are exclusively for-
eign. The conclusion to be drawn from the hypothetical is that, even if
the crimes in Gusikoff had been considered part of the same transaction
under Justice Brennan's test, the court still would have had no precedent
for barring extradition on double jeopardy grounds.
An interesting situation would arise if in the above hypothetical de-
fendants had been acquitted of defrauding the American investors, per-
haps because of lack of evidence showing that defendants had conducted
the scheme in the first place. Defendants then could argue that, aside
from the same transaction bar to their extradition, the collateral estoppel
rationale of Ashe v. Swenson prevents their retrial on the same issue of
ring)). Indeed, the only mention of Sindona by the Fifth Circuit is found in a brief footnote at
the end of its opinion. See id. n.6.
63 Id. at 463; see text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
64 619 F.2d at 178.
65 Id. at 179.
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perpetration of a fraud with regard to a different victim. 66 Unless the
court again found the scope of the crime too broad and the possible
repercussions too great to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it
seems that defendants would be immune from any further prosecution
relating to the British investors. Pursuant to Article IX(l) of the Extradi-
tion Treaty, extradition will be granted only if the evidence is found suf-
ficient "according to the law of the requested party" to bring the
defendant to trial on the charges of the requesting party. 67 If the U.S.
court finds that defendants did not engage in any fraudulent activity,
under Ashe "[t]he federal rule of law. . . would make a second prosecu-
tion for the [same crime with regard to a different victim] wholly imper-
missible. ' '68 This result theoretically could immunize the foreign crimes
from punishment by preventing the British courts from trying defend-
ants for crimes against its citizens.
A final consideration, added by the Guskof court almost as an after-
thought, is the notion of conspiracy versus substantive crime. As the
court noted, it is a generally accepted principle that "the conspiracy to
commit a crime and the crime itself are separate offenses" and conviction
for one does not bar prosecution for the other.69 Defendant's U.S. con-
viction for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, therefore, would
not bar a subsequent British prosecution for the substantive crime of
fraud. Therefore, the court need not have resorted to any of the confused
and inconclusive "same offense" tests to reach its holding. The court's
reasons for nevertheless choosing to do so may rest on the involvement of
an extradition treaty and consequent effect of its decision on a very sensi-
tive area with international implications. Due to these factors, the court
preferred to use as authority another extradition case, Stowe, instead of
using a standard conspiracy versus substantive crime decision such as
Pinkerton v. United States .7 Another explanation for the court's reliance
on the same offense tests is that the court wanted to expound upon the
controversial definitions of "same offense." Following as it did on the
66 Se text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
67 Treaty, supra note 12, at art. IX(l). Most of America's extradition treaties contain a
clause stating that the determination of defendant's extraditability is to be made under the law
of the requested party, which in the cases discussed in the text is the United States. See, e.g.,
Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Italy, Jan. 18, 1973, art. X, 26 U.S.T. 493,
T.I.A.S. No. 8052. Therefore, the criteria for determining whether the offense already tried is
the same as that in the extradition request is a matter of American law.
68 397 U.S. at 445.
69 620 F.2d at 464. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) ("the plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a convic-
tion for both offenses"); United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1064 (5th Cir. 1978) ("acquit-
tal on the substantive counts does not foreclose prosecution for the conspiracy").
70 328 U.S. 640 (1946). In JA/certon, defendants were convicted for violations of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. The indictment contained several substantive counts and one conspiracy
count. Defendants urged, on certiorori to the Supreme Court, that the substantive counts had
become merged in the conspiracy count, warranting a single sentence for the conspiracy only.
The court affirmed the position that "the commission of the substantive offense and a conspir-
acy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses." Id. at 643.
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heels of Sindona, the case became a guinea pig for the international com-
munity to see whether the same transaction approach would be sustained
in a second extradition case by another U.S. circuit. The Fifth Circuit,
however, refused to accord anything but secondary importance to the
new approach. The Fifth Circuit's tactic seems a reasonable one. The
offenses involved in the case were not similar enough to warrant a step
into practically unexplored territory-the case was easily and justly de-
cided under the old rules. An important consideration here is that the
Supreme Court has yet to grant or refuse certiorari to Si'ndona. The
Supreme Court has not accepted the same transaction approach as a ma-
jority view and therefore a grant of certiorari to Stndona may yield some
enlightening commentary on the matter. Until the Supreme Court ad-
dresses this issue, the Fifth Circuit appears content to remain with the
commonly accepted tests for determining identity of offenses, at least, in
cases like Guskof, where application of such tests creates no uncertain
double jeopardy consequences.
-SHELLEY M. GOLDSTEIN
